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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 14-1397
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
THADDEUS VASKAS,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5-12-cr-00128-001)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 15, 2015
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 22, 2015)
____________
OPINION*
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Thaddeus Vaskas appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

guilty plea. We will affirm.
I
In November 2007, federal agents executed a search warrant at Vaskas’s home in
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, after learning that he had purchased a membership to the child
pornography website “Illegal CP.” Once inside, agents spotted a laptop computer later
found to contain hundreds of images of pre-adolescent and adolescent girls exposing their
genitalia and engaging in sexual activity. The computer also contained a folder used by a
file-sharing program called “Morpheus” that included, among other things, one completed
download and three partial downloads of child pornography videos. These videos bore
extremely graphic names, such as “PTHC Tara 8yr - Tara gets molested by a clown.wmv.”
PSR ¶¶ 16–17.
In March 2012, Vaskas was arrested and charged with one count of possessing
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Vaskas initially moved to
dismiss the indictment. He argued that, based on a report by computer forensics expert
Tami Loehrs, the content could have been downloaded without his knowledge.
Accordingly, the damning evidence on his computer was not proof that he knowingly
possessed child pornography. The Government opposed Vaskas’s motion to dismiss and
moved, under Federal Rules of Evidence 414 and 404(b), to admit his prior conviction for
possessing child pornography and his subscription to Illegal CP.

2

In August 2012, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Vaskas
with three counts of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B), and one count of receiving it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).
Vaskas ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of possession. During his guilty plea
hearing, Vaskas stated under oath that he understood that he was being charged with one
count of knowingly possessing child pornography, and he accepted the Government’s
recitation of the facts. “Mr. Vaskas, are you pleading guilty here today because you are, in
fact, guilty as charged?” the Court asked. “Yes,” Vaskas responded. Supplemental App.
(SA) 119.
After the Probation Office prepared a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report but before
sentencing, Vaskas decided to withdraw his guilty plea. His lawyer then filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, believing that withdrawal of the plea was not in his client’s best
interest. The District Court granted counsel’s motion and appointed new counsel, at which
point Vaskas proceeded to file a formal motion to withdraw his plea. The Court held a
hearing on Vaskas’s motion, during which Vaskas testified that, at the time of the guilty
plea, he was aware that Loehrs was conducting a supplemental investigation into whether
a computer virus could have put illicit images on his computer, but had not seen the actual
report until after his plea. Vaskas said his first lawyer had not shared the report with him
and had fired Loehrs without consulting him. “[D]uring the time I pled guilty,” Vaskas
stated, “I asked about the [second] report. I was led to believe it didn’t even exist. . . .
And, my lawyer was giving me misleading information by saying that I had no chance to
3

win in the trial, and that his best advice for me was to take the plea.” SA 141. Vaskas said
the second report clearly showed a virus had put the images on his computer and that he
would not have pleaded guilty had he seen that report. Nevertheless, Vaskas declined to
introduce the second report into evidence.
The District Court denied Vaskas’s motion to withdraw his plea. Judge Bartle
noted that Vaskas had looked him “in the eye” and said he was guilty and that he had
failed to show “fair and just reason” to withdraw his plea now. SA 168. The Court
sentenced Vaskas to 168 months’ imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release.
Vaskas now appeals.1
II
A guilty plea cannot be withdrawn “on a lark,” United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S.
670, 676 (1997), and the defendant bears the “substantial” burden of showing “fair and
just reason” for the withdrawal, United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003);
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d). We have made clear that “[a] shift in defense tactics, a change
of mind, or the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to impose on the government
the expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a defendant who has already acknowledged his
guilt by pleading guilty.” United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992)).
1

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986).
4

In evaluating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we consider (1) whether the
defendant asserted his innocence; (2) whether the government would be prejudiced by the
withdrawal; and (3) the strength of the defendant’s reasons for wanting to withdraw.
Brown, 250 F.3d at 815 (citing United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1989)).
For the first factor, “[b]ald assertions of innocence” are not enough, id. at 818; they must
be “buttressed by facts in the record,” id. (quoting United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159
F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1998)). In addition, the defendant must provide sufficient
explanation for why he took a contradictory position at his guilty plea hearing. Jones, 336
F.3d at 253.
Vaskas claims the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. He asserts that his first lawyer failed to inform him of a
potentially exculpatory expert report, and that he pleaded guilty only because he thought
that he had no means of verifying his innocence. But now, he says, he can proclaim his
innocence based on an expert report he received after the plea that “allowed for the
possibility” that the illicit content on his computer had been downloaded via virus, without
his knowledge or consent. Vaskas Br. 15. Vaskas argues that the second report provides a
“key piece of information” supporting his innocence, which requires us to vacate his guilty
plea and remand his case for trial. Id. at 17–18.
We decline to do so. First, Vaskas failed to make a sufficient assertion of
innocence. At his guilty plea hearing, Vaskas stated under oath that he knowingly
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possessed child pornography on his computer in violation of § 2252(a)(4)(B). See SA 99–
100, 166–69. Now, Vaskas says he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about
another report that “allowed for the possibility” that a virus had put the content on his
computer. This is not a profession of innocence. Instead, Vaskas is claiming that he would
have gone to trial had he known about the report because he might have been acquitted
based on its findings. In essence, Vaskas is saying that he misjudged his prospects at trial.
And our caselaw makes clear that this is not sufficient to warrant withdrawal of a guilty
plea. See Jones, 336 F.3d at 252–55; Brown, 250 F.2d at 815–16.
Second, Vaskas failed to sufficiently explain why he took two contradictory
positions under oath. See Jones, 979 F.2d at 318. During his plea colloquy, Vaskas
admitted that he knew he possessed child pornography. If anything, the new evidence
shows there might be some other reason why the material showed up on his computer. It
does not, however, explain why he previously testified that he knew he possessed that
same material.
III
For the reasons stated, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Vaskas’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The order of the District Court will be
affirmed.
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